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Old Federalism
Before examining New Federalism,  it might be  a good  idea to take
a look back at what was "Old Federalism"  - a period that extended
from the end of the  Korean War to  1978.  We can use Proposition  13,
the tax revolt year,  as the end of the era.
Old Federalism was marked by tremendous growth in state and local
spending.  State and local  spending  during this period rose at  a con-
sistently  faster  rate  than  did the  economy  and  federal  aid  was  the
fastest growing element within the state-local fiscal structure.  (Figure
1 and Table  1)
In fact,  our  federal  aid system  grew  so fast that some  students  of
federalism  likened  it  to  a  rogue  elephant  that  would  soon trample
down all of the traditional barriers that had protected state and local
governments from unwarranted federal intrusion.  (Table 2) These stu-
dents documented their concern  with several findings that also stand
out as significant features  of Old Federalism.
First:  There was ever-increasing  state-local  reliance on federal  funds.
In 1955 federal aid amounted to only about 10 percent  of the revenue
the state and local governments  were raising on their own; by 1978 it
had risen to 32  percent.
Second:  There was a tremendous proliferation  of these very narrow
categorical  aids.  During the same post-war period the number  of sep-
arate  federal aid programs that were being sent out to state and local
governments  shot up from about 50 in 1950  to 132  by  1960, and over
500 by 1978. We had federal aid programs for everything - you name
it. There  was  no area  of state-local  activity  that did  not have  some
federal  aid counterpart.
There  was also the inevitable growing federal  intrusion  into areas
of traditional state-local concern. This rapid and rather disorderly growth
of the federal aid system  sent federal dollars into all phases  of state-
local operations.  But instead  of bringing clear-cut  federal  control,  it
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resulted  in a  mish-mashing  of federal,  state,  and local  activity  with
some real loss in accountability,  efficiency,  and public  confidence.
Now,  there is  also a good  side  to federal  aid - the  down side has
been  emphasized  quite  a  bit recently.  That same  federal  aid  system
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THE STATE-LOCAL  SECTOR TURNAROUND
(State and Local  Government  Expenditure,'  as a Percent  of Gross National  Product,
Selected Years  1949-1981)
State-Local
Total State  Expenditure  From
Calendar  and Local  Federal  Own Funds
Year  Expenditure  Aid  State2 Local 2
1949  7.8  0.9  3.4  3.5
1959  9.6  1.4  3.8  4.4
1969  12.6  2.2  5.3  5.1
1974  14.3  3.1  6.0  5.2
1975  14.9  3.5  6.2  5.2
1976  14.7  3.6  6.1  5.0
1977  14.0  3.5  5.7  4.8
1978  .13.9  3.6  5.6  4.7
1979  13.5  3.3  5.6  4.6
1980  13.5  3.4  5.6  4.5
1981  est.  12.9  3.0  5.5  4.4
1National  Income and  Product Accounts. Includes federal  aid.
2The National Income  and Product Accounts  do not report state and local government
data  separately.  The  state-local  expenditure  totals  (National  Income  Accounts)  were
allocated  between  levels  of  government  on  the basis  of ratios  computed  from  data
reported by the  U.S. Bureau  of the Census in the annual governmental  finance  series.
Source:  ACIR staff.
built the world's finest interstate highway system; it provided a lot of
aid to poor people and it bolstered the sagging fortunes of central cities.
So  it  is necessary  to  look at the federal  aid system  in balance  - at
the good  as well as at the bad.
Federal Aid  Cutbacks
Nevertheless,  it was against this background of growing federal  in-
trusiveness  that President Reagan  called for a major streamlining  of
the federal  aid system.  Long before Ronald  Reagan  became President
he became  convinced that  state and local governments  could  operate
much  more  efficiently  if they  were  relieved  of a  good  share  of the
federal  regulations  and controls.  He promised if elected to cut back a
bloated federal  aid system.
President  Reagan's New Federalism has three  objectives:  First: to
decrease  sharply state-local reliance  on federal  aid;
Second:  to cut back sharply on the number of federal  aid programs;
and
Third: to compensate state and local governments for the loss of this
federal aid by returning to them part of the federal excise tax base
and  by swapping programs.
Well,  has that happened?
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4.In the last two or three years we have had one of the most dramatic
turn-arounds  in the history of our intergovernmental  relations.  Now
there is decreasing  state-local reliance  on federal aid. Since  1979  fed-
eral aid has dropped  from about 32  percent  of state/local  own  source
revenue down to around  22 percent.  Secondly,  there has been a very
substantial  reduction  in  the number  of federal  aid  programs.  Since
1981  the number of federal  aid programs has dropped from about 535
to less than 400 - 395 is the last body count.
These actions have caused a real reduction in federal intrusion  into
state-local  affairs. The creation of block grants,  the cutbacks, coupled
with some progress on the deregulation  front, all add up to less federal
involvement in state-local  affairs.
Actually, this is an amazing record.  If someone had told the federal
aid watchers  three  or four  years  ago that the hard  charging  federal
aid system would  be stopped  dead in its tracks and then bent  back-
wards, most of them would not have believed it. We thought that the
system was out of control, that there was only one way it could go and
that was up.
But the  sticking  point  in the New  Federalism  is  this - it is  cold
turkey. It's "do-it-yourself federalism." The cutbacks are taking place,
but state and  local governments  are not getting  compensatory  aid in
the form of tax turnbacks.
What caused this remarkable trend-break? Looking back (and hind-
sight's always  20/20), we could have made the prediction that federal
aid could  not keep expanding.  Why?  Because  by 1981  Congress  had
lost  its  four  fiscal  trump  cards  thereby  insuring  a  very tight  fiscal
situation.  What were  those trump cards that Congress lost?
Defense Card:  The first was the defense card.  After Korea, defense
spending  fell from about 13  percent of gross national product to 6  1/2
percent of GNP by 1978. This freed up tremendous amounts  of federal
revenue - some was earmarked for tax cuts, but most went to finance
the growth of federal domestic programs,  in general,  and new federal
aid  programs,  in  particular.  In effect,  Congress  was taking  revenue
away  from the Pentagon and pushing  it into the domestic  social wel-
fare programs  administered in large part by states and localities.
By  1981,  there was  widespread  agreement that the nation had un-
derinvested  in defense  during the '70s.  In fact, after  Afghanistan the
Carter Administration  began to step up defense  outlays.  As a result,
defense  spending  is now rising as a percent  of GNP,  and it is placing
a tremendous  squeeze on all other areas of the  federal budget.
Deficit  Card:  The  second  congressional  advantage  was  the deficit
card.  During  most of the  post  World  War  II  period,  Congress  spent
more  money than  it took  in and papered  over  its  revenue  shortfalls
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was accepted  without too much concern.
By  1981  deficit financing  had come to  be viewed as contributing  to
inflationary  expectations  and higher  interest rates.  It had really  be-
come  a part of the  nation's number one  problem,  a  sluggish inflated
economy.  The  growing  demand  to balance  the  budget,  or at  least  to
try to keep deficits  under control has also started to put a squeeze  on
all other elements of the budget.
Income  Tax  Card:  The third  card  Congress  had lost by  1981  was
the federal income tax card. During the '60s and '70s  inflation, as well
as real growth, automatically pushed people up into higher and higher
tax brackets. The impressive growth performance  of the federal income
tax actually  served  as a major  argument  for federal  revenue  sharing
with states and localities, back in the late '60s, early '70s.
By 1981 there was a strong demand for federal income tax cuts and
indexation.  These  actions  designed  to take a good  share  of the infla-
tionary wind  out  of the income  tax sails  also build  more  fiscal  disci-
pline into the system.
Social  Security  Card:  Congress  also  lost the  Social  Security  card.
And that might surprise  you. What relationship  does Social  Security
have to the rest of the domestic budget? During the late 1960s and the
early  1970s,  the Social  Security financing  contributed  to an easy fed-
eral  budget  situation  because  in  most years  the various trust funds
within the social security system were running surpluses that reduced
the apparent  deficit in the  unified federal budget.
By  1981  Social  Security  financing  problems  were  making  a  tight
budget situation  even tighter because  the  Social Security  funds were
running deficits in their  own accounts, thereby  adding to rather than
reducing  the  deficit  in the  unified federal  budget.  In addition,  there
was growing  opposition  to higher Social  Security tax hikes to finance
steadily  expanding coverage.
The  Four Way  Squeeze:  To sum up, by  1981 there was  a four-way
squeeze on federal aid - the generals and admirals were moving back
into  the budgetary  arena,  the  Social  Security  system was  coming  in
for  additional  help;  the taxpayers  were  getting  tax  cuts;  and  deficit
financing  was no  longer fashionable.
Even  if Jimmy Carter had  been reelected,  the  days  of federal  aid
expansion  would  have  been  over.  In  fact,  I  heard  one  of President
Carter's aides tell the state budget officers shortly before the election,
"If Jimmy Carter  is reelected,  I can  promise you one thing. The days
of wine  and  roses  are  over  as  far  as  bigger  and  better  federal  aid
programs  are  concerned."  He  underscored  most  of the  fiscal  facts  of
life that I have just listed.
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The Reagan administration's  decision in  1981 to  go  for a major in-
come tax cut and a much faster defense buildup  quickly transformed
an already tight budget situation  into an extremely  tight budget sit-
uation.  Under  such  circumstances  relatively  low  priority federal  aid
programs were  the first to be sent to the austerity  chopping block.
There is an iron law that governs the expansion and the contraction
of federal aid within the federal budget. When times are easy as they
were  in the '50s and the '60s and the early '70s,  federal aid expands.
When times  get tougher,  the rate  of federal  aid growth  slows down.
When the budget crunch really gets tight, there  is an actual reduction
in federal aid flows.
The policy implication  is  clear - to control  the federal  aid system
it is necessary  to keep the Congress  on a very short fiscal  leash. That
is  exactly what the  Reagan  administration  did when  it went for  the
big tax cut and at the  same time accelerated defense  spending.
It should  also be noted that there is another reason why we see this
remarkable  turnaround  in federal  aid behavior.  The Reagan  admin-
istration  used  the budget  reconciliation  process  skillfully in  1981  to
effect both grant consolidation and federal aid cutbacks.  The conserv-
atives have discovered that the budget reconciliation  process is a pow-
erful instrument  for imposing federal discipline  on the  Congress  and
facilitating  the down-sizing  of the federal aid system.
As  a result we have, in effect, New Federalism without the compen-
sation  of tax turnbacks.  There is a real  reduction in federal aid flows,
a  real reduction  in the number  of federal grants  - it might  well  be
called  "austerity federalism."
While  this federal  aid  squeeze  has been  taking  place,  the  White
House has also been negotiating with governors and mayors and other
representatives  on  the  President's  plan  for  eliminating  many  more
federal  aid programs  and compensating  state  and  local  governments
for the federal  aid cuts.  (Table  3).
Barriers to New  Federalism
It  is  not surprising  that  the  White  House  and representatives  of
state and  local governments are taking such a long time  agreeing on
what the legislative package should look like. They will need the wis-
dom  of  a  Solomon,  the  patience  of Job,  the  tenacity  of  a  Winston
Churchill, and someone with the political insights of a James Madison.
Why?  Because  they must come  up  with a plan that can  cope  with
the tremendous  diversity  of this federal  system  of ours.  They  must
reconcile  the  savagely  competing  federal,  state,  and  local  interests.
They must  also  balance  the differing  weights  that liberals  and  con-
servatives assign  to such values as efficiency,  economy,  and equity.
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OUTLINE  OF THE  REAGAN  ADMINISTRATION'S
LATEST "NEW FEDERALISM"  PROPOSAL
(Administration FY  84 Projected Dollar Levels)
1.  States assume full cost of AFDC - $8.1 billion.
2.  States  lose  $30.6 billion  to the elimination  of categorical  aid in  35 program  areas.
Among the major federal categorical  aid programs  eliminated are  highway aids  (ex-
cept interstate and primary roads)  $1.5 billion,  mass transit $3.1 billion,  CDBG $3.5
billion,  waste-water  treatment  $2.4  billion,  general  revenue  sharing  $4.6  billion,
child nutrition $3.2 billion, social services block grant $2.4 billion, low income energy
assistance  $1.9  billion,  and CETA  $2.9  billion.
3.  States gain $18.3 billion  as a result of federal  assumption of Medicaid  costs.
4.  States  gain  $11.6  billion  for turnback  of certain  excise  taxes. Federal  taxes desig-
nated for turnback are tax on alcoholic beverages,  tobacco, telephone,  cigarettes,  (8¢),
and  motor fuel  (2¢).
5.  States  gain  $8.8  billion  from  federal  general  revenue  turnback.  For  at  least  four
years, these  amounts  would be  returned  to the states via  payments  from a federal
trust fund.
Source:  ACIR staff compilation,  September  20,  1982.
A few examples will point up the problems that the negotiators face.
President  Reagan  and  many  of his  White  House  associates  believe
sincerely  that  a means-tested  public  welfare program  can be  admin-
istered  far more  effectively  and  with  far greater accountability  once
the states assume complete responsibility  for the care  of the poor.
In sharp  contrast, many state and  local officials  have contended for
years that an equitable distribution  of the benefits and the burdens of
taking care  of poor people  can only be achieved if the federal govern-
ment takes  over the welfare task  lock, stock,  and barrel.  They argue
that if welfare  is turned back to the  states, there will be competitive
underfinancing  of welfare benefits as each state tries to push the poor
on to  the next state.
Then there  is the  medicaid  dilemma.  How can  the federal  govern-
ment provide a uniform schedule of medicaid benefits for people across
this country without either cutting back  on the benefits now provided
to beneficiaries  in the high benefit  states like New  York  or creating
substantial  additional  program  costs for the federal Treasury?
Another  issue  New  Federalists  have  to hammer  out is  the  role  of
local  government  in our federal  system.  Many federal  and state poli-
cymakers yearn for the good old days when Washington spoke only to
the  states, and only the states spoke  to their children,  the local  gov-
ernments.  They  claim  that we ought to  clean  up our cluttered  inter-
governmental  system and get our lines of authority straight by having
states  deal  exclusively  with  local  governments.  As  can  be  expected,
many  local  officials,  (and they  have  a  lot  of clout  in  the  House  of
Representatives),  bitterly  contest  this  view  and  point  out that  they
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expect no great change  of heart in the future.
If the friends of New Federalism  can get over these welfare,  medi-
caid,  local government  hurdles and agree  on a plan for streamlining
the federal  aid system, then they confront a truly formidable  barrier
- a hostile Congress. Washington has only one stock in trade and that
is power. Committee  chairmen,  be they Democrats  or be they Repub-
licans, will not preside  easily over the liquidation  of their categorical
aid  empires.  It  is  one  thing  for the Congress  to  retreat  grudgingly
under massive  budgetary pressure;  it is  an entirely  different  matter
to  expect them  to meekly  turn over  part of their revenue  domain  to
state and local governments  as unconditional  compensation  for elim-
ination  of federal categorical  aids.
The Second  Best  Approach: Fiscal  Discipline
In theory,  the new  Federalism  issue  should  be characterized  by  a
bracing intellectual  discussion as to the best way to sort out program
responsibilities  between  federal,  state,  and  local government.  On the
basis of rational criteria  certain responsibilities  would be assigned to
the federal  government, others to the state and still other tasks to the
localities.  The federal  government  would then  concentrate  its efforts
only in those areas of true national concern.  Out would go the federal
aid programs for jellyfish control,  pothole repair, urban gardens, so on
and so forth. State and local  governments would then work their will
in most areas of domestic  concern.
Unfortunately,  no one  appears to possess the magic wand that will
create the consensus needed in Washington, at the state level, and at
the local  level to unscramble  our diverse and  highly interrelated sys-
tem.
We may have to settle for New Federalism  - austerity federalism.
This second best version is to be found in the convincing demonstration
that the federal  aid  system  is no  longer  an irresistible  force  threat-
ening  to overrun state and local  governments.  It can be harnessed  as
long  as the Congress  is  forced  to  operate  under  powerful  fiscal  con-
straints.
Prognosis:  What is the prognosis  or the evaluation to date? While
state  and  local  governments  are  still in  the  process  of moving  from
affluent  federalism  to austerity federalism,  it is possible to make cer-
tain  tentative  judgments  about  equity  and  accountability  and  effi-
ciency effects  that flow  from this transition.
The  equity  effect  appears  fairly  clear.  Because  of the cutbacks  in
social  welfare  programs,  many  of the  working  poor are  now  finding
their  lot more  difficult than it was  in the recent past. While this  ad-
ditional  hardship may not prove to  be as great as many  liberals pre-
dict,  it is greater than many  conservatives  would like to admit.
125The accountability  effect of this great transition from fast growth to
slow  growth, is  also fairly  discernable.  Even if the Congress  does not
approve  President Reagan's  New  Federalism  proposals for decentral-
izing our system, the continuing federal budget crunch  ensures a dim-
inution of federal  involvement  in state-local  affairs.  Fiscal  austerity
is  hurrying  political  decentralization  along and  the  emergence  of a
"do-it-yourself  federalism"  should  make  it  easier  for  voters  to  hold
their state and local  officials  accountable.
The jury is still out  on the efficiency  effects  of this  great transfor-
mation from  affluence  to  austerity.  One thing  is  certain;  most state
and  local  officials  will  no  longer  be  able  to  do  more  and  more  with
more and  more.  Most state and local policymakers will be confronted
with  three  hard efficiency  alternatives:  do  more  with less;  do  about
the same with less;  or do less with less.
The  tone  and the  quality  of American  government  over  the  next
several  years  will  be determined  largely  by the  way  state and  local
officials answer  and respond  to these austerity alternatives.
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